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I. INTRODUCTION
The North American Free Trade Agreement (the "Agreement" or
"NAFTA") entered into force in January 1994.' The Agreement, which
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law; A.B., Ph.D. (Philosophy), Harvard University; J.D., Yale University. I would like to thank Al Cullison, Detlef Leenen,
and Ruperto Patifio Maniffer, for their most helpful insights on these issues.
The author accepts responsibility for the substantive accuracy of citations to non-English sources. Translations are the author's unless otherwise noted.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 296, 605
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constitutes an extension of the Free Trade Agreement between the United
States and Canada (the "U.S.-Canada Free-Trade Agreement"),' will undoubtedly have an impact beyond trade. It will intensify, to an almost
unimaginable degree, the social, political, and economic contacts between
the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
At the moment, there is some debate as to whether, and if so how,
other Latin American countries should join the free trade group. Chile
seems to be already on its way. Argentina, Brazil, and Columbia have
expressed strong interest. It is, to be sure, uncertain whether an extension
of the Agreement is at all likely in light of the political climate that has
developed, particularly in the United States, following this year's financial
crisis in Mexico. A more fundamental question, however, is whether an
extension would be in the interest of current and potential members.
My skepticism regarding any such expansion is based not on economic, but rather, on legal grounds. The Agreement seems to have failed
sufficiently to take into account the special legal identity of Mexico. The
process leading to the Agreement did not take the form of a conversation
on bridging the legal distance between the parties, but rather that of an
imposition of legal conformity on the weakest party. Mexico not only had
to Americanize its legal system,' but also had to accept a pre-fabricated
legal superstructure based almost entirely on U.S. law. A hasty incorporation of other Latin American countries would probably thrust a similar
fate upon them.
But this article does not dwell extensively on the broad question
whether the Agreement should incorporate additional Latin American
countries, nor does it attempt to show that the U.S. perspective pervades
the Agreement as a whole. The article focuses exclusively on the procedural apparatus that the Article imposes on the legal systems of the parties, specifically in the area of antidumping and countervailing duties. It
argues that the dispute resolution mechanisms to review such duties are
almost completely derived from U.S. civil procedure.
The article then points out that a different conception of civil procedure prevails in Mexico. This conception seems to be rooted in the civil
law tradition and accordingly resembles that of other civil law jurisdictions, particularly that of Germany. The comparison with the German

[hereinafter NAFrA].
2. United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27

I.L.M. 293 [hereinafter U.S.-Canada Free-Trade Agreement].
3. See Stephen Zamora, The Americanization of Mexican Law: Non Trade Issues in the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 391 (1993).
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procedural picture, which has often been studied and regarded as a model
in the United States, is meant to facilitate the understanding and appreciation of the Mexican picture. The article ultimately suggests that the discussion on dispute resolution in the context of the Agreement would have
been more enlightened if it had taken the Mexican conception of procedure into account. The possibility being contemplated is not, however,
that of patching some of the best elements of the Mexican procedural
picture onto the existing review procedure, but rather that of coherently
imagining a new procedure inspired in part by the Mexican perspective.
In the same breath, the article concedes that the underlying political
and economic circumstances precluded any such possibility. Given its
commanding upper hand, the United States did not come to the process in
order to engage in dialogue, but instead to impose conditions. It is unlikely that the Mexican government, even if it had been committed to its
legal identity, would have been able to alter this attitude.
In its concluding section, the article also ventures a few general
observations with respect to the central topic of this conference, i.e., the
expansion of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Mexico's experience should perhaps be a lesson to other Latin American countries. They
would be well advised to continue strengthening the free trade agreements
that already exist among themselves before trying to join the North American block. They could thus develop their own dispute resolution mechanism as well as their own vision of commercial consolidation. They could
then be in a position further down the road to approach the North American countries as solid and independently defined trading groups, rather
than as individual, struggling nations.
II. MEXICO IN THE NAFTA NEGOTIATIONS

The Mexican government came to the NAFTA bargaining table in a
position of weakness. It was under considerable pressure, both internal
and external, to strike a deal. Internally, the Mexican government needed
desperately to legitimize itself in the face of growing challenges by the
opposition and increasing popular dissatisfaction with the sacrifices exacted for the prospect of free trade. Externally, it realized that the nation had
to brace itself for the fierce international competition unleashed by the
culmination of the cold war. Mexico felt it would fall behind hopelessly
if it failed to find new partners and markets.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Mexican
negotiating strategy was characterized by a shy reluctance to make demands and an uncontrolled willingness to make concessions. The Mexi-
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can government made no serious attempt to protect Mexico's culture,
sovereignty, and private industry. It repeatedly gave in to the claims of
foreign capital, the United States government, as well as unions and environmental groups from the north.
The conciliatory stance of the Mexican government undeniably did
the nation much good. By listening to the critical (though often hypocritical) voices from abroad, it opened up a rich discussion on workers'
rights, the environment, democracy, and even social justice. This debate,
much as it may now be tearing the country apart, was long overdue. The
price of many years of forced silence on these issues had been much too
high.
It seems just as clear, however, that Mexico was substantially
harmed in the process of negotiating NAFTA. In its eagerness to embrace
the ways of its wealthy trading partner, the government abandoned many
of Mexico's own economic and legal institutions. No consideration was
given the possibility that these institutions might be more conducive to
well-being and justice, at least in light of Mexico's circumstances, than
those being imported. The government, moreover, appeared to be operating under the assumption that the Mexican experience had nothing to
contribute to the process of creating an integrated North American market
of goods and services. Mexico's interests as well as its self-esteem suffered. The process was not one of coordination or harmonization of institutions but rather one of assimilation.
Of course, the Mexican government is not entirely to blame. Its
position could perhaps be best described by invoking words Jean-Paul
Sartre used in a different context: "Half victims, half accomplices, like
everybody else."4 Mexico's negotiating partners gave the Mexican government no choice. They offered what was being served and had no interest in suggestions. If Mexico had spoken up in favor of Mexicanizing the
Agreement, it would have been shown the door right away.
Canada and the United States signed a Free Trade Agreement in
1988.' The government of Canada seemed not to regard the inclusion of
Mexico as a priority. It certainly would have objected to allowing the
Mexican government to change the rules of the game. The United States
government, for its part, was inclined to bring Mexico aboard but knew it
would face strong domestic opposition. The United States was convinced
that if it permitted the government of Mexico to impose conditions, it

4.

Simone de Beauvoir, 2 LE DEUXItME SEXE 5 (epigraph) (1949) (quoting Jean-Paul Sartre).

5.

U.S.-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, supra note 2.
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would not be able to generate sufficient support for the Agreement.
The two dominant parties, particularly the United States, would
undoubtedly harden their bargaining posture when faced with a subsequent application of any other Latin American nation to join the free
trade group. In light of the difficulties the Mexican economy has encountered of late, the United States would probably be very skeptical about
enlarging the free trade zone. Any Latin American government vying to
sit at the negotiating table would likely give up any hope of transforming
the Agreement and be willing to assimilate.
This article focuses on the impact of the Agreement on Mexican law,
rather than on its economy. Mexico belongs to a different legal tradition
than the United States. As a civil law jurisdiction, Mexico has a legal
system that in many ways is closer to that of continental Europe than to
that of the United States. Within the civil law tradition, of course, the
Mexican legal system is most directly related to the legal systems of other
Latin American countries. Further, on the basis of Mexico's own peculiar
history, the legal system in some respects has developed its own personality, distinct even from other Latin American jurisdictions. At any rate,
from the perspective of U.S. law, the Mexican legal reality is a world
apart.
In preparation for the Agreement, Mexico made significant changes
in its substantive and procedural laws in the areas of environmental protection, agrarian regulation, intellectual property, economic competition,
international trade, and foreign investment.6 Additionally, the Agreement
itself imposes on Mexico a legal superstructure affecting all of these
areas, as well as government procurement, administrative law, dispute
resolution, telecommunications, and immigration. 7 The Mexican regime
apparently failed to consider adequately the impact to the distinct Mexican legal persona when it acquiesced to this radical change in substantive
and procedural law.
The main concern of this article is the procedural superstructure that
the Agreement imposes on the parties' legal systems, particularly in the
areas of antidumping and countervailing duties. It is in these areas that
the Agreement elaborates a very detailed procedure.

6. See David H. Badiola, Summary of Recent Legislative and Administrative Developments in
Mexico, 2 U.S.-MEx. LJ. 65, 65 (1994).
7. NAFrA, supra note 1, pmbl., art. 102, chs. 11-16.
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III. PANEL REVIEW UNDER NAFTA ARTICLE 1904
Under the general definition in Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), dumping takes place when a foreign product is sold at a price lower than that charged in the exporting country
The GATT also requires that injury to domestic producers be proven.9
State officials often impose antidumping duties on products after determining that they have been dumped in their jurisdiction. Countervailing
duties are used against subsidized foreign products.'0 In theory, the point
of both kinds of duties is to eliminate the foreign product's unfair advantage in the market, i.e., the extent to which the price of the product has
been artificially reduced. "Thus, an anti-dumping duty brings the price of
the merchandise to the price at which it is sold in the exporting country's
market-or a countervailing duty is applied [to balance] the subsidy
granted to the product.""
The North American Free Trade Agreement allows the parties-as
well as private persons through those parties-the option of foregoing
judicial appeal in the local courts and challenging final determinations
through binational panels.'" This option was a feature of the earlier U.S.Canada Free-Trade Agreement. 3 The Mexican government struggled avidly (against the skepticism of the north) to incorporate the panel review
system into NAFTA; most certainly, Mexico was concerned that
antidumping and countervailing duties provisions might be used by its
northern neighbors as a non-tariff barrier to trade. 4 This eagerness probably explains why the Mexican authorities accepted the original system as
it was, instead of bargaining for significant changes.

8. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. VI § l(a), 61 Stat. A3, A23
[hereinafter GATI']. In the absence of a comparable domestic price in the exporting country, dumping
is taken to consist in selling the foreign product in the importing country below the price charged for
the product in a third country or below the cost of production "plus a reasonable addition for selling
cost and profit." Id. art. VI § 1(b).
9. Id. art. VI § 6(a).
10. See id. art. VI § 3.
11. Victor C. Garcia Moreno & Cksar E. Hen-Andez Ochoa, Neoprotectionism and Dispute Resolution Panels as Defense Mechanisms Against Unfair Trade Practices:A Focus on Mexico, in I TOWARD SEAMLESS BORDERS: MAKING FREE TRADE WoRK IN THE AMERICAS 692, 699 (Boris
Kozolchyk ed., 1993).
12. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, § 1.
13. See United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Sept. 28,
1988, 102 Stat. 1851, art. IV.
14. See Garcia Moreno & Hernindez Ochoa, supra note 11. The authors see a neoprotectionist
trend in the use of antidumping and countervailing duty determinations as non-tariff trade barriers.
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The procedure for binational panel review of final antidumping and
countervailing duty determinations is set forth generally in Article 1904
of the Agreement. Pursuant to Article 1904, the parties adopted the
NAFTA Article 1904 Panel Rules to specify the details of this procedure."5 In case of any inconsistency between the panel rules and Article
1904, or any other part of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the
Agreement prevails. 6 Procedural questions not covered by the rules may
be resolved by analogy to the rules or by reference to the rules of procedure of the court that would otherwise have jurisdiction to review the
administrative deternination. 7 "A panel may, [moreover,] adopt its own
internal procedures ... for routine administrative matters," as long as
those procedures are not inconsistent with the 1904 Panel Rules."8
The binational panel review is supposed to "replace judicial review
of final antidumping and countervailing duty determinations"' 9 upon the
request of any involved NAFTA parties. Once any of these parties properly chooses the path of binational panel review, the domestic judicial review option is eliminated.' A panel decision can be overturned only by
the panel itself on a motion for re-examination 2 or by an extraordinary
challenge committee if the panel is guilty of gross misconduct, of fundamental procedural error, or of exceeding its authority.22
The panel must decide whether the determination "was in accordance
with the antidumping or countervailing duty law of the importing Party,"" i.e., of the country where the investigating authority sits. "For this
purpose, the antidumping or countervailing duty law consists of the relevant statutes, legislative history, regulations, administrative practice and
judicial precedents to the extent that a court of the importing Party would
rely on such materials in reviewing a final determination of the competent
investigating authority."" The panel review, hence, is substantively
equivalent to ordinary judicial review. What varies is the identity of the
decisionmaker and the applicable procedural law.

15. North American Free Trade Agreement: Rules for Article 1904 Binational Panel Reviews, 59
Fed. Reg. 8686 [hereinafter 1904 Panel Rules].
16. Id. Rule 2.
17. Id.
18. Id. Rule 17.
19. NAFTA, supra note I,art. 1904, 1. See also 1904 Panel Rules pmbl.
20. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, 1J11.
21. 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rules 75-76.
22. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, %13.
23. Id.1l2.
24. Id.
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One of the main objectives in creating the binational review option
was to augment the speed of appealing final antidumping and countervailing duty determinations. The Agreement as well as the panel rules set
forth a strict timetable. The Agreement specifically requires that the rules
be designed "to result in final decisions within 315 days of the date on
which a request for a panel is made."' Figure 1 provides an overview of
the different stages and time frame of the procedure.
The panel review commences as soon as one of the involved
NAFTA parties requests a binational panel. 6 Article 1911 defines "involved Party" as "(a) the importing Party; or (b) a Party whose goods are
the subject of the final determination."" Paragraph five of Article 1904,
in turn, provides that an involved party may "on its own initiative...
request review of a final determination by a panel.""8 The secretary for a
party's section of the Secretariat typically makes the request on behalf of
the party. The Secretariat, which is divided into three national sections
each headed by a secretary, was established by the Free Trade Comnission to assist the Commission in the implementation and elaboration of
the North American Free Trade Agreement.29 United States law, for instance, proclaims: "In the case of a final determination of a competent
investigating authority, requests by the United States for binational panel
review of such determination under Article 1904 shall be made by the
United States Secretary."3
In most cases, however, the initiative will probably be taken by the
individual entitled to judicial review of a final antidumping and countervailing duty determination. The individual cannot make the request directly but rather must go through one of the NAFTA parties, since Paragraph
2 of Article 1904 empowers only an "involved Party" to "request a panel
review."31 Yet, Paragraph 5 obligates an involved party, "on request of a
person who would otherwise be entitled under the law of the importing
Party to commence domestic procedures for judicial review of a final

25. Id. 114.
26. See 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 6 ("A panel review commences on the day on
which a first Request for Panel Review is filed.").
27. NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 1911 (definitions section defines "involved Party").
28. Id. art. 1904, 15.
29. Id. art. 2002, M 1-2. The Free Trade Commission, which is also a creature of the Agreement,
is "comprised of cabinet-level representatives of the Parties" or the designees of those representatives.
Id. art. 2001, 1.
30. 19 U.S.C. § 3434(b) (1994).
31. NAFFA, supra note 1, art. 1904, 2.
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Final AD/CD Determination Review
Individual party request on national party

Individual otherwise
entitled to judicial review

National party request for binational panel

In writing within 30 days of
final determination

5 members:
1) 2 by each involved
party in consultation
within 30 days
[Complaint 30 days after Request 2) 1 by consensus within
30 days
55 days or by allotted
party within 61 days
Administrative record certification
3) Chairperson by majority
1 60 days
of panelists or by lot
Complainant brief
Panel selection]

60 days

Respondent brief
15 days

Reply briefs I
115-30 days

Oral argument[

Right to appear with counsel
for determining authority and
individuals otherwise entitled

90 days

Declaratory opinion

Request for reconsideration

Reconsideration

Within 90 days of panel selection
Written decision on the record
Findings of fact and determination
by majority with dissents and
concurrences
Within 14 days of declaratory
opinion
Within 30 days of request

Affrmance

Remand

Review of remand

Within the maximum time for
final determination by authority
in a normal investigation
Within 90 days

Figure 1: AD/CD Determination Review
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determination, [to] request such review."" The government, in other
words, does not have the option of refusing to place a request for a panel
review of the final determination when asked by an individual entitled to
judicial review.
The usual procedure would be for the individual to approach the
section of the Secretariat in the country in which the determination took
place. The responsible secretary (i.e., the secretary of the section of the
Secretariat "located in the country in which the final determination under
review was made")33 would then, as required by the panel rules, "forthwith forward a copy of the Request to the other involved Secretary" 34
(i.e., of the section of Secretariat set up by the exporting country challenging the determination). The responsible secretary's act of forwarding
the individual's request would count officially as the request for panel review, and as such serve as point of reference for the deadlines for the
subsequent stages of the panel proceeding. 5 The responsible secretary
must also serve all persons on the service list, which enumerates the
persons involved in the prior proceedings,36 and announce the request in
the official publications of the countries involved.37
It would, nonetheless, be perfectly consistent with the Agreement for
the individual to petition the other involved secretary because the Agreement, as already noted, requires one of the involved parties to make a
request on behalf of an individual entitled to review. The other involved
secretary would then be the one required to forward the request to her
counterpart. In addition, she would have to serve individuals on the service list and make sure the request is printed in the official publications.
This approach is contrary to the panel rules but more in harmony with the
Agreement.3"
The request must "be made in writing ... within 30 days following

32. Id. H5.
33. 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 3 (definitions and interpretation of "responsible Secretariat" and "responsible Secretary").
34. Id. Rule 35(1)(a).
35. United States law deems the receipt of the individual's petition by the United States Secretary, ipso facto, "a request for binational panel review within the meaning of Article 1904." 19 U.S.C.
§ 3434(c) (1994). This runs counter to the Agreement, which, as noted, requires an involved NAFTA
party to make a request on the other involved party. The request takes place, within the meaning of
Article 1904, when the United States Secretary channels the request to the other involved party, not
when she receives the request from the individual.
36. 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 3 (definitions and interpretation of "service list").
37. Id. Rules 35(1) & (2).
38. The only change in the rules needed for this purpose would be to substitute the words "an
involved Secretary" for "the responsible Secretary" in 1904 Panel Rules 35(1) & (2).
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the date of publication of the final determination."39 The request must
include the heading required of all pleadings' and detailed information
for the identification of the final determination sought to be reviewed."
In addition, the request must be filed with the responsible secretary of the
section of the Secretariat in the country where the final determination
took place.42
The request sets the panel selection process in motion. The members
are usually drawn from a roster instituted by the three NAFTA parties,
which is supposed to "include judges or former judges to the fullest extent practicable" and "at least 75 candidates"-at least twenty-five selected by each party.43 The individuals listed are expected to "be of good
character ... [and show] reliability, sound judgment and general familiarity with international trade law."' They must "be citizens of Canada,
Mexico or the United States," but may neither be affiliated with nor take
instructions from he government of any of these countries.45
The panel consists of five members, with a majority of "lawyers in
good standing."' Each involved NAFFA party in consultation with the
other party names two members as panelists within thirty days of the
request.47 Each has "the right to exercise four peremptory challenges, to
be exercised simultaneously and in confidence, disqualifying from appointment to the panel up to four candidates proposed by the other involved Party."" "Peremptory challenges and the selection of alternative

39. NAFIA, supra note 1, art. 1904,

4.

In the case of final determinations that are not published in the official journal of the importing Party, the importing Party shall immediately notify the other involved Party of such
final determination where it involves goods from the other involved Party, and the other
involved Party may request a panel within 30 days of receipt of such notice.
Id.
40. 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 55(1). The heading includes the title of the panel
review, a descriptive title of the pleading, the name of the pleader, as well as the name, address,
telephone number, and signature of counsel. Rule 55(2) contains specific information on the format of
the pleadings. Id. Rule 55(2). Rule 55(3) requires pleadings to be signed by counsel for the participant or, in the absence of counsel, by the participant herself. Id. Rule 55(3).
41. Id. Rule 34(2)(b) (requiring title, investigating authority, file number, and citation).
42. Id. Rule 34(d).
43. NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1901.2, l 1.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. J[ 2.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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panelists [are supposed to occur] within 45 days of the request for the
panel."'49 If either of the involved NAFTA parties fails to make an appointment within thirty days or to select an alternate for a peremptorily
stricken candidate within forty-five days, one of that party's candidates on
the roster must be chosen by lot immediately thereafter to take the slot.'
Within fifty-five days the parties are expected to agree on the fifth
panel member.5 In the absence of consensus, one of the parties, chosen
by lot, will make the final appointment from the roster ("excluding candidates eliminated by peremptory challenges") within 61 days of the request.52 The chairperson of the panel will be one of the lawyers on the
panel elected by a majority of the panelists, or by lot if none of the contenders obtains majority support.5 3 Upon completion of the selection of
the panel, the responsible secretary must notify the participants as well as
the other involved secretary of the names of the panelists. 4
Within thirty days after the request, the interested person (i.e., the
person who would otherwise be entitled to judicial review) must file a
complaint.55 The due date for the complaint thus coincides with that for
the appointment of the first four panel members. The final appointment,
in turn, can take place up to 31 days after the deadline for the complaint.
The 1904 Panel Rules require the interested person to file "proof of

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.T3.
52. Id.
53. Id. ( 4.
54. Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 42. The NAFFA parties have committed themselves to a
code of conduct for the panelists. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1909. Panelists may be removed for
violating that code but only if the involved NAFTA parties agree. Id. annex 1901.2, 1 6; see also
1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 43. The party who appointed a removed panelist presumably
chooses a replacement in consultation with the other party. If a panelist selected by consensus is
removed, the parties should try to agree on a replacement. If they cannot agree, one of the parties,
chosen by lot, should select a replacement from the roster. A similar replacement procedure should be
followed when a panelist becomes unable to perform her duties. In cases of disqualification as well as
of inability, the panel is "suspended pending the selection of a substitute panelist." NAFTA, supra
note 1, annex 1901.2, 9; see also 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 81.
Each panelist is required to apply for protective order under U.S. law or a disclosure undertaking under Canadian or Mexican law in order to access business proprietary or privileged information
relevant to the case. NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1901.2,
7. Panelists will be sanctioned for
breaching the terms of the protective order or disclosure undertaking but are otherwise "immune from
suit and legal process relating to acts performed by them in their official capacity." Id. annex 1901.2,
'118 & 12. During their tenure, panelists may engage in other business that does not interfere with the
performance of their duties but "may not appear as counsel before another panel." Id. annex 1901.2,
(H 10-11.
55. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, 14(a); 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 35.
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service on the investigating authority and on all persons on the service
list" along with the complaint.56 The complaint must detail "the precise
nature of the Complaint, including the applicable standard of review and
the allegations of errors of fact or law, including challenges to the jurisdiction of the investigating authority."5 The complaint must also state
why the complainant has standing to file.58 It must specify, in other
words, that the complainant is the person who would normally be entitled
to judicial review under the laws of the country where the final
antidumping or countervailing duty determination was made. 9 The rules
also regulate the amendment of the complaint. An amended complaint
may be filed up to forty days after the request.' Thereafter the complainant may amend only if she obtains leave of the panel and if she files
the amended complaint no later than one hundred days after the request."
Within forty-five days of the request, the investigating authority and
any person asking to participate must file a notice of appearance.6 2 The
notice must declare whether the appearance is in support of, in opposition
to, or partly in support of and partly in opposition to, the allegations of
the complaint.63 The authority must set forth any admissions made to the
allegations set forth in the complaint.' The soliciting individual must defend her right to participate in the proceeding.65
Within forty-five and sixty days of the request, i.e., "within 15 days
after the expiration of the time period fixed for filing a Notice of Appearance," the investigating authority must file nine copies of its final determination, two copies of the administrative record, and two copies of an
index for record (including proof of service of the index on all participants).' Chapter 19 of NAFTA defines the administrative record, in the
absence of an agreement by the NAFTA parties, as follows:
(a) all documentary or other information presented to or obtained by the competent investigating authority in the course of
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 39(1).
1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 39(2)(b).
Id. Rule 39(2)(c).
See id. Rule 39(3).
Id. Rule 39(4).
Id. Rule 39(5).
Id. Rule 40(1).
Id. Rule 40(1)(d).
Id. Rule 40(1)(c).
Id. Rule 40(1)(b).
Id. Rule 41(1); see also NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, lJ 14(b).
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the administrative proceeding, including any governmental memoranda pertaining to the case, and including any record of ex
parte meetings as may be required to be kept; (b) a copy of the
final determination of the competent investigating authority,
including reasons for the determination; (c) all transcripts or
records of conferences or hearings before the competent investigating authority, and (d) all notices published in the official
journal of the importing Party in connection with the administrative proceeding.67
Proprietary information must be under seal and privileged, or government
information may be filed only with consent of the investigating authority.6

The complainant and her supporters must file a brief within sixty
days after the expiration of the deadline to submit the administrative
record, i.e., no later than 120 days after the request.6' The brief must set
forth "grounds and arguments supporting allegations of the Complaint."7
The respondent, as well as others aligned with the respondent's allegations, must file a brief "setting forth grounds and arguments opposing
allegations of [the] Complaint" up to sixty days thereafter, i.e., within 180
days of the request.' The complainant's side may file rebuttal briefs
replying to the respondents' briefs no later than fifteen days after the
deadline for the respondents' brief, i.e., up to 195 days after the initial
request for panel review.72 Within ten days of the deadline for any of
these briefs, the participants must file an "appendix containing authorities
cited."73 A participant may join others in a single brief or adopt parts of
their briefs in her own.74
If the complainant fails to file a brief or motion for extension of
time, the panel may--on its own motion or the defendant's motion-"issue an order to show cause why the panel review should not be dis-

67. NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 1911 (defining "administrative record").
68. 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rules 41(3)-(5).
69. Id. Rule 57(1); see also NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, T 14(c).
70. 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 57(1).
71. Id. Rule 57(2); see also NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 1904, 14(d).
72. 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 57(3); see also NAFTA, supra note 1,art. 1904,
14(e).
73. 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 57(4). Each party must include specific information
in their various appendices, and "all participants who file briefs" bear equally the "costs for compiling
the appendix." Id. Rule 60.
74. Id. Rule 57(5).
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missed."75 If the complainant fails to show good cause, the panel must
dismiss the review.76 If the investigating authority does not file a brief,
the panel may go ahead and issue its decision, apparently without an oral
hearing. 77
Rule 59 offers detailed guidance on the content of the briefs. Briefs
must be divided into five parts: (1) Table of Contents and Authorities; (2)
Statement of the Case; (3) Statement of the Issues; (4) Argument; and (5)
Relief7 The statement of the case in the complainant's brief must "contain a concise statement of the relevant facts. 79 In the respondent's
brief, this second part must "contain a concise statement of the position of
the investigating authority or the participant with respect to the statement
of facts set out in the briefs" on the complainant's side.' The argument
part for either side consists "of the argument setting out concisely the
points of law relating to the issues."8"
Motions must "be made by Notice of Motion in writing ... unless
the circumstances make it unnecessary or impracticable," and must be
served on all participants." They must "be accompanied by a proposed
order of the panel." 3 In addition, Rule 61 requires each notice of motion
to include the following:
(a) the title of the panel review, the Secretariat file number for
that panel review and a brief descriptive title indicating the
purpose of the motion; (b) a statement of the precise relief requested; (c) a statement of the grounds to be argued, including a
reference to any rule, point of law or legal authority to be relied
on, together with a concise argument in support of the motion;
and (d) where necessary, references to evidence in the administrative record identified by page and, where practicable, by
line. 4
A participant may file a response to the motion within ten days, unless
the panel decides otherwise.85 The pendency of a motion, however, does
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. Rule 58(2).
Id. Rule 58(3).
Id. Rule 58(4).
Id. Rule 59.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Rules 61(1) & (2).
Id. Rule 61(2).
Id. Rule 61(3).
Id. Rule 62. The rules make distinctions between motions for extension of time and those for
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not alter the time frame of the panel review. 6 The panel may dispose of
the motion based on the pleadings or hear oral argument before decid7

ing.8

In response to a motion for dismissal, the panel may order the dismissal of the review and thus put an end to the entire proceeding.8 If all
participants join or consent to a motion for termination, the panel review
must be terminated. 9 The panelists are thus automatically discharged,
regardless of their opinions of the merits of the case.
The panel may hold a pre-hearing conference.'e The purpose of the
conference would be "to facilitate the expeditious advancement of the
panel review by addressing such matters as (a) the clarification and simplification of the issues; (b) the procedure to be followed at the hearing of
oral argument; and (c) any outstanding motions."'" Following the conference, the panel must issue an order setting out its rulings in connection
with the conference.'
The main event during the panel review is the hearing of oral argument. The hearing must commence no later than thirty days after the
deadline for reply briefs, i.e., before the 225th day after the filing of the
request for panel review.93 The hearing, like the pre-hearing conference,
takes place at the office for the section of the Secretariat in the country
where the final determination occurred, or at any other location designated by the responsible secretary.94 The responsible secretary must notify
all the participants "of the date, time and place for the oral argument. '
Unless the panel orders otherwise, the hearing will adhere to the
following time frame: first the panel will hear the complainant and her
supporters; then the investigating authority and other opponents of the
complainant will follow; finally, the panel may, at its discretion, allow the
complainants and their supporters an argument in reply.9

re-examination. First, a participant must respond to a motion for extension of time within seven days.
Id. Rule 20(2). Second, unless the panel orders otherwise, no response is allowed to a motion for reexamination of the panel's decision. Id. Rule 76(5).
86. Id. Rule 61(4).
87. Id. Rules 63(1) & (2).
88. Id. Rule 71(1).
89. Id. Rule 71(2).
90. Id. Rule 66(1).
91. Id. Rule 66(3).
92. Id. Rule 66(5).
93. Id. Rule 67(1); see also NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, 1 14(0.
94. 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 65.
95. Id. Rule 67(1).
96. Id. Rule 67(2).
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Counsel of record will conduct oral argument, unless the participant
is appearing pro se.97 The oral argument must be "limited to the issues
in dispute." ' If proprietary or privileged information is going to be discussed, the oral proceedings must be conducted in camera, in the presence
of only the person presenting the information, the investigating authority's
officials and attorneys, and persons granted access to the information, including the panelists. 99
Within ninety days of the hearing of oral argument, i.e., no later than
315 days after the original request of review, the panel must issue its
decision.'" "Decisions of the panel shall be by majority vote and based
on the votes of all members of the panel. The panel shall issue a written
decision with reasons, together with any dissenting or concurring opinions
1 1 The
of the panelists.""
panel must either uphold the final determination, or remand it for action not inconsistent with the decision."°
The responsible secretary must, at the behest of the panel, order
notice of every panel decision "published in the official publications of
the involved Parties."'' 0 3 In addition, the responsible secretary must publish a "Notice of Final Panel Action" following an order dismissing a
panel review or affirming a determination on remand.' A "Notice of
Completion of Panel Review," in turn, must be published as soon as time
to request an extraordinary challenge has elapsed or upon termination of
the extraordinary challenge proceeding. 5
A participant may, within ten days of the panel's decision, file a
motion for re-examination "for the purpose of correcting an accidental
oversight, inaccuracy or omission."'" In addition to identifying "the
oversight, inaccuracy or omission with respect to which the request is
made," the motion must describe "the relief requested" and state, "if
ascertainable,. .. whether other participants consent to the motion."'"
The panel rules limit the grounds upon which the motion may be based to
97. Id. Rule 67(4).
98. Id. Rule 67(5).
99. Id. Rule 69.
100. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, J 8.
101. NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1901.2, 5; see also 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 72
("A panel shall issue a written decision with reasons, together with any dissenting or concurring opinions of the panelists, in accordance with Article 1904.8 of the Agreement.").
102. NAFIA, supra note 1, art. 1904, 9J8.
103. 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 70.
104. Id. Rule 77(1).
105. Id. Rules 78 & 79.
106. Id. Rule 76(1).
107. Id.
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the following: "(a) that the decision does not accord with the reasons
therefor; or (b) that some matter has been accidentally overlooked, stated
inaccurately or omitted by the panel."' 8 The rules, moreover, proscribe
oral argument on a motion for re-examination and allow for no response,
unless the panel orders otherwise." ° Within seven days of the filing of
the motion, the panel must either rule on the motion or identify further
action to be taken."
When remanding a case, the panel must set a deadline for a new
determination by the investigating authority."' The investigating authority must thereupon take action consistent with the panel's decision.
The panel rules call on the investigating authority to file "with the responsible Secretariat a Determination on Remand within the time specified by the panel."" 2 It must also file the supplementary remand record,
if any, within five days."3 A participant who wants to challenge the determination on remand must file a written submission within twenty days
of the filing of the supplementary remand record (or of the determination
on remand if there is no supplement)." 4 The investigating authority and
its supporters must file their responses to the challengers' written submission within twenty days of the deadline for that submission."' If there
are no written submissions in opposition to the determination on remand,
the panel must, within ten days of the deadline for the submission, affirm
the determination." 6 If there are written submissions, the panel must decide no 7 later than ninety days after the arrival of the determination on remand.' '
IV. A PROCEDURE TAKEN FROM THE 1988 U.S.-CANADA FREE-TRADE
AGREEMENT

The procedure for reviewing final antidumping and countervailing
duty determinations was assembled while the free trade effort concerned
only the United States and Canada. Not surprisingly, the procedure takes
the perspective of, and focuses on, the interests of those two countries.

108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Rule 76(2).
Rules 76(4) & (5).
Rule 76(6).
Rules 73(1) & 74.
Rule 73(1).
Rule 73(2)(a).
Rules 73(2)(b) & (3)(a).
Rule 73(3)(b).
Rule 73(5).
Rule 73(6).
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For instance, the rules allow the use of English or French when a panel
reviews a determination made in Canada: "[e]ither English or French may
be used by any person or panelist in any document or oral proceeding.,,18 Moreover, if legal issues of "general public interest or importance" are involved, or if the proceedings are conducted, at least in part,
in both languages, there must be simultaneous translation and the panel
orders must be made available in both English and French." 9
There is as much of a need to accommodate the Spanish language as
the French. Virtually all of Mexico's over ninety million inhabitants
speak Spanish, and extremely few speak fluent English. Yet, there is no
provision whatsoever for the use of the Spanish language in the proceedings to review determinations made in Mexico.
The absence of a specific provision for the use of the Spanish language in panel reviews of Mexican final determinations is most probably
a consequence of the fact that the panel rules were essentially copied
from those previously designed for the United States-Canada Free-Trade
Agreement. Those original rules, for obvious reasons, did not have to take
into account the peculiarities of Mexican proceedings. In all likelihood,
the drafters of the new set of rules did not give enough thought to the
extent to which the rules had to be modified to be applicable to Mexican
proceedings.
Moreover, Canadian law protects the right to use the French language far more zealously than Mexican law protects the right to use
Spanish. For instance, the Canadian "Official Languages Act" declares
both English and French official languages and specifically orders "every
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative body.., established by or pursuant to an Act of Parliament" to make sure that at its central office
"members of the public can obtain available services from it and can
communicate with it in both official languages."' 20 Mexico has no
equivalent statute.
In any case, in reviewing Mexican final determinations, panels may
adopt an approach to incorporate Spanish speakers parallel to that established to accommodate Francophones in Canadian panel review proceedings. Rule 2 declares that procedural questions not covered by the rules

118. Id. Rule 29.
119. Id. Rules 30 & 31. The complaint as well as all notices of appearance must specify whether
the person "intends to use English or French in pleadings and oral proceedings before the panel," and
"requests simultaneous translation of any oral proceedings." Id. Rules 39(2)(d) & 40(1)(e); see id.
Forms 3-4.
120. Official Languages Act, R.S.C, c.0-2, s.l.

CONNECTICUTJOURNAL OF INTL LAW

[Vol. 11:61

may be resolved by analogy to the rules.12' In fact, the wisest approach
would be to make space for the use of English, Spanish, and French in all
panel review proceedings.
The language issue is not in itself crucial. It acquires transcendence
as a symptom of a larger problem with the panel review procedure and
with the agreement as a whole. As a latecomer to the North American
free trade game, and as the weakest party sitting at the bargaining table,
Mexico was never allowed to contribute in a meaningful way to the process that produced the Agreement. It was presented a contract of adhesion
and told to sign if interested. The 1904 panel review procedure as a
whole-just like the treatment of language in the procedure-is part of
this phenomenon. It completely disregards the Mexican viewpoint and
priorities.
V. THE REPRODUCTION OF U.S. PROCEDURAL DETAILS
The panel review procedure is, in fact, a creature of U.S. law. The
United States had already imposed its legal structure in the earlier free
trade negotiations with Canada. If the influence of the Canadian government on procedure was minimal, that of the Mexican regime was nonexistent. Mexico not only became involved in the negotiations later than
Canada, but also came into the process in a much weaker bargaining
position.
In addition, the legal system of Mexico is in many respects further
removed from U.S. law than that of Canada. Canada shares a common
law background as well as a history of intellectual, cultural, and institutional cooperation with the United States. Mexico, in contrast, has civil
law roots and its relation with its northern neighbor has often been
characterized by conflict, mistrust, and distance. Insofar as it is based on
U.S. procedural law, NAFTA's procedural component is more disruptive
to the legal system of Mexico than to that of Canada.
The extent to which the 1904 Panel Rules bear the imprint of U.S.
law cannot be exaggerated. The organization of the rules calls to mind the
U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The panel rules break down into
several parts, which resemble the headings that divide the federal rules.
Figure 2 shows how even the sequence is quite similar. Only the Federal
Rules section on "parties" has no equivalent in the panel rules, which
simply refer to the law of the jurisdiction in which the final determination
was made to define the party-configuration.'2 2
121. 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 2.
122. In addition to the involved NAFTA parties and the investigating authority, the participants in
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1904 Panel Review Rules

U.S. Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure

Rule I.
I.
General

Scope
II.

II.

Commencement of Panel Review

III.
IV.

Panels
Proprietary/Privileged Information

V.

Written Proceedings

Pleadings and Motions

III. Pleadings and Motions
IV. Parties
+ V. Discovery

VI.

Oral Proceedings

VII. Decisions/Completions of Panel Review
VIII. Completion of Panel Review

VI. Trials
VII. Judgments
VIII. Provisional/Final Remedies;
Special Proceedings
-I IX. District Courts/Clerks
* X. General Provisions

Schedule/Procedural Forms

Appendix of Forms

Figure 2:1904 Panel Rules and U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Beyond a general structure, the 1904 Panel Rules duplicate-often
word by word-many particular elements of the United States Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Panel
Rules delineate a hybrid procedure with an initial pleading phase derived
from federal trial practice and a second phase of briefs and oral argument
based on federal appellate practice. The extent to which they duplicate the
Federal Rules is astonishing.
Rule 2 of the 1904 Panel Rules, for example, enunciates: "The purthe proceeding are interested persons, i.e., persons "who, pursuant to the laws of the country in which
a final determination was made, would be entitled to appear and be represented in a judicial review of
the final determination." Id. Rule 3 (definitions and interpretation of "participant" and "interested person").
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pose of these rules is to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive review of
final determinations... "123 This language has clearly been borrowed
from Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which declares that
the rules "shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action."' 24 Even in setting its
purpose, the panel review procedure simply imitates the United States
civil procedural system.
There are, of course, many more similarities. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Rules of Appellate Procedure state that a court
may adopt "rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these
rules."'" Panel Rule 17(1), for its part, declares: "A panel may adopt its
own internal procedures, not inconsistent with these rules, for routine
administrative matters. ''" 2" Further, the Panel Rule on computation of
time is very similar to its counterpart in both sets of Federal Rules. That
is, all three regimes first establish that a time period excludes the day of
the event that sets off the time clock but includes the last day of that
period, and go on to explain the conditions for extending a time peri27
od.1
Moreover, section 3 of Panel Rule 55, requiring every pleading to be
signed either by counsel or by a pro se participant, has its mirror image
in Federal Rule 11.2 More important, the content of the pleadings in
both procedural schemes is quite similar. The complaint and the responsive pleading mainly consist of a statement of the person's claim and
demand for relief,'29 while motions essentially include a statement of the

123. Id. Rule 2.
124. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
125. Id. Rule 83; FED. R. APP. P. 47.
126. 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 17(1).
127. 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rules 19 & 20; FED. R. CIrv. P. 6; FED. R. APP. P. 26.
128. Compare 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 55(3) ("Every pleading filed on behalf of a
participant in a panel review shall be signed by counsel for the participant or, where the participant is
not represented by counsel, by the participant.") with FED. R. Civ. P. 11 ("Every pleading, motion,
and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented
by an attorney shall sign the party's pleading, motion, or other paper and state the party's address.").
129. Compare 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 39(2) ("Every Complaint... shall contain
the following information[:]... the precise nature of the Complaint, including the applicable standard
of review and the allegations of errors of fact or law, including challenges to the jurisdiction of the
investigating authority" and "a statement describing the interested person's entitlement to file a Complaint.") and id. Rule 40(1) (The "Notice of Appearance" shall contain "a statement as to the basis for
the person's claim of entitlement to file a Notice of Appearance" and "a statement as to whether appearance is made" in support of opposition to the complaint.) with FED. R. Civ. P 8(a) ("A pleading"
shall contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,
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supporting grounds and the proposed order. 3
The briefs allowed in panel reviews, in turn, are the same as those
used in federal appellate procedure. There is a brief by the petitioner, a
brief by the respondent, and a reply brief by the petitioner."' Like the
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Panel Rules also provide for amicus
curiae briefs, though in more limited circumstances.'
The Panel Rules define the content of the briefs in virtually the same
way as the Rules of Appellate Procedure describe the brief of the appellant. The panel rules require five parts: (1) Table of contents and table of
authorities; (2) Statement of the case; (3) Statement of the issues; (4)
Argument; and (5) Relief. 33 The brief of the appellant in federal appellate proceedings must have five identical headings. 3 4 Both sets of rules
also coincide in mandating that briefs include an appendix of authorities
referred to. 13' They also contain almost identical provisions on joint
briefs; Panel Rule 57(5), on the one hand, reads: "[a]ny number of participants may join in a single brief and any participant may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another participant."'" Rule of Appellate
Procedure 28(i), on the other hand, dictates that "any number of either
or
[appellants or appellees] may join in a single brief, and any appellant
37
another."'
of
brief
the
of
part
any
reference
by
adopt
may
appellee
The prehearing conference in panel review is hard to distinguish
from that in federal appeals. Panel Rule 66 affirms:
(3) The purpose of a pre-hearing conference shall be to facilitate
the expeditious advancement of the panel review by addressing
such matters as: (a) the clarification and simplification of the

and a demand for the relief the pleader seeks.").
130. Compare 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 61 ("Every Notice of Motion... shall be
accompanied by a proposed order of the panel" and "shall contain.., a statement of the grounds to
be argued.") with FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (The motion generally "shall state the grounds therefore, and
shall set forth the relief or order sought.").
131. Compare 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 57(l)-(3) with FED. R. App. P. 28(a)-(c).
132. FED. R. App. P. 29 permits amicus curiae to file briefs when the parties consent or when the
court grants leave. 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 57(7), in contrast, simply states that in a
review of a determination made by a United States investigating authority, another investigating authority, which has made a determination involving the same goods and related issues, "may file an
amicus curiae brief."
133. 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 59.
134. FED. R. App. P. 28. In 1991, the FED. R. App. P. were amended to require an additional
heading on subject matter and appellate jurisdiction.
135. Compare 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 60 with FED. R. APP. P. 30.
136. 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 57(5).
137. FED. R. App. P. 28(i).
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issues; (b) the procedure to be followed at the hearing of oral
argument; and (c) any outstanding motions....
(5) Following a pre-hearing conference, the panel shall promptly
issue an order setting out its rulings with respect to the matters
considered at the conference. 3
In the same vein, prior to its 1994 revision Rule of Appellate Procedure
33 dictated that "a prehearing conference to consider the simplification of
the issues and such other matters as may aid in the deposition of the
proceeding by the court. The court or judge shall make an order which
recites the action taken at the conference . .,."" Rule of Appellate Procedure 33 defined the purpose of the prehearing conference somewhat
more generally than Panel Rule 66, but the conferences in both procedures are clearly supposed to perform the same role in very much the
same way.
Finally, the panel review oral hearing is unquestionably modeled
after the oral argument in federal appellate procedure. The usual format,
including the order of the argument, is basically that employed by United
States courts of appeals. First, the petitioner's side makes its oral argument.'" Second, the respondents present their side of the argument. 4 '
And, third, petitioners argue in rebuttal. 42 Upon describing the oral argument, Panel Rule 67 avers: "If a participant fails to appear at oral argument, the panel may hear argument on behalf of the participants who are
present. If no participant appears, the panel may decide the case on the
basis of briefs."'4 3 Making the same point more circuitously, Rule of
Appellate Procedure 34(e) reads:
If the appellee fails to appear to present argument, the court will
hear argument on behalf of the appellant, if present. If the appellant fails to appear, the court may hear argument on behalf of
the appellee, if present. If neither party appears, the case will be
decided on the briefs unless the court shall otherwise order.'"
Regardless of whether some or all of the participants show up, the panels
run oral proceedings from the same script as federal appellate courts.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rules 66(3) & (5).
FED. R. APP. P. 33 (1994). Rule 33 was changed in 1994. See FED. R. APP. P. 33 (1995).
1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 67(2)(a).
Id. Rule 67(2)(b).
Id. Rule 67(2)(c).
1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 67(3).
FED. R. APP. P. 34(e).
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VI. THE REPRODUCTION OF THE U.S. PROCEDURAL CONCEPTS
Naturally, Article 1904 and the Panel Rules have assimilated, along
with the details, the underlying conceptions of United States procedural
law. James F. Smith has made the following comments regarding the
procedure for safeguarding the panel review system set forth in Article
1905: "I was recently struggling with NAFTA Article 1905, which I think
many of you are going to come to know and have some emotional reaction to. It is a very complicated provision, and I was struck [by] how its
concepts are extraordinarily Anglo/American."' 45 It is possible that he
actually meant Article 1904. At any rate, he could have made exactly the
same remarks about Article 1904, as well as about the Panel Rules stemming from that Article. The panel review procedure embodies the conception of procedure characteristic of the common law, particularly as it has
developed in the United States.
The 1904 panel review procedure is centered around a single hearing, in which the attorneys present their clients' versions of the facts and
interpretations of the law. The concentration of the legal procedure into
one event is paradigmatic of the common law tradition. In most common
law cases, the lawyers bring forth all the evidence and arguments at once
before the jury. Because congregating the jury gives rise to considerable
difficulty, it does not make much sense to have various sessions spread
out throughout the duration of the litigation."
This consolidation of the main litigious activity into a single event
has been associated with an increase in formality and even drama. The
common law trial must traditionally comport to precise rules to ensure
that the factual and legal issues are properly aired-particularly in front
of the jury-and to minimize the risk of having to retry the case. The
legal actors--especially the attorneys-are accordingly under considerable

145.

James F. Smith, Discussion of the Differences between the United States
and Mexican Legal

Systems, I U.S.-MEx. L.J. 113 (1993).
146. See Arthur von Mehren, The Significance for Procedural Practice and Theory of the Concentrated Trial: Comparative Remarks, in 2 EuRoPkiscHmS RECHTSDENKEN IN GEscHICHTE UND
GEGENWART: FESTSCHRFT FUR HELMuT COING 361, 364 (N. Horn ed. 1982); John H. Langbein, The
German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 823, 863-64 (1985); JOHN MERRYMAN,
THE CIviL. LAW TRADmON 112 (2d. ed. 1985). Von Mehren argues that trials had to be concentrated
also because, "at least until relatively modern times, there was probably no way in which material
presented at widely separate points in time could have been preserved in a form that would have
enabled the jury to refresh its recollection when it ultimately came to deliberate and render the verdict." Von Mehren, supra, at 364-65.
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pressure to offer their best performance during this crucial period. 47 As
the central episode in a panel review, the oral hearing will always tend to
be like the common law trial. As the central episode, it often takes place
with rigidity and intensity, often resembling a knightly joust.
The Panel Rules provide for two other kinds of face-to-face encounters between the panelists and the attorneys. However, these meetings are
demarcated from and subordinated to the central oral hearing. First, the
panel may hear oral argument before ruling on a motion by one of the
participants." This gathering is supposed to facilitate decisions on the
preliminary or side issue(s) raised in the motion before going into the
main issue during the oral hearing. The panel may, secondly, hold a "prehearing conference."' 49 This gathering is principally aimed at clarifying
the issues or the procedure of the oral hearing. 5 ' The panel review fits
well within the U.S. common law tradition not simply because of the
number of oral hearings contemplated. The defining feature is the centrality attributed to and formality associated with the main hearing, i.e., the
oral argument. The oral argument takes a role in the panel review
analogous to that of the trial in civil litigation in the United States.
The 1904 panel review procedure also embraces the classic common
law notion of a separate, self-standing, long-winded pleading phase. The
common law traditionally viewed such a phase as necessary in order
thoroughly to prepare the ground for the classic one-shot trial. In common
law jurisdictions, John Merryman explains, "precise formulation of the
issues in pleading and pretrial proceedings is seen as necessary preparation for the concentrated event of the trial."'' By replicating this phase
the panel review process almost over-prepares the case for the oral argument. It provides for requests of review, complaints, notices of appearance, and all kinds of motions.'52 Of course, in addition to these numerous pleadings, the rules call for various briefs by the participants.' 53
U.S. law has increasingly tended to solve disputes during the pleading phase, or at least during the pre-trial stage. That stage often consists
of various rather flexible hearings and written exchanges between the
parties. This trend, however, has been uneven. The extent to which cases

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See MERRYMAN, supra note 146, at 113.
1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 63(2).
1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 66.
Id. Rule 66(3).
MERRYMAN, supra note 146, at 113.
See 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15.
See id.
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are resolved before the trial and the degree of informality of pre-trial
proceedings varies, depending on the particular judge and on the kind of
case involved; complex litigation is more likely to escape the rigid common law procedural format. The traditional picture of civil procedure,
moreover, continues to influence civil proceedings profoundly. Article
1904 panel review proceedings may occasionally depart from that picture,
but will never be completely delivered from it.
The idea of assigning a passive role to the panel and allocating ultimate control to the participants in 1904 panel review procedure also comports with the common law model. In common law jurisdictions, the
traditional view is that the controversy involves and interests only the
parties to the action. The parties are accordingly taken to be in the best
position-both cognitively and motivationally-to probe into the matter.
The parties and their attorneys produce and introduce the evidence and
arguments. The decisionmaker-the court or the jury-is reactive; it
chooses among the competing versions of the facts and of the law. It may
not object to particular factual or legal interpretations agreed upon by the
parties or even to an uncontested termination of the controversy. Similarly, in a panel review proceeding under Article 1904, the panel must limit
itself to "(a) the allegations of error of fact or law, including challenges to
the jurisdiction of the investigating authority, that are set out in the Complaints filed in the panel review; and (b) procedural and substantive defenses raised in the panel review."' 54 Panel Rule 35 requires the responsible secretary expressly to underscore this restriction when serving
the participants."' The panel is precluded from, sua sponte, coming up
with errors in or justifications for the determination. It may not consider
any issue unless raised by the participants.
The Panel Rules also assign final control to the participants when a
case that has been reversed and remanded returns for a second panel
review."6 Rule 73 establishes that if none of the participants files a
written submission challenging the new determination, the panel must
"issue an order affirming the investigating authority's Determination on
Remand." ' 7 The panel must affirm even if it believes that the investigating authority's determination on remand is inconsistent with the
panel's earlier decision.
The establishment of a joint panel review under Panel Rule 36 offers
154. 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 7.
155. Id. Rule 35(1)(c)(iii).
156. Id. Rules 73(2)(b) & (3)(a).
157. Id. Rule 73(5).
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a fimal example of the panel's passivity vis-A-vis the participants. A joint
panel to review two different final determinations involving the same
goods may be held only if one of the participants so moves.158 Yet, if
any of the participants objects, "the motion shall be deemed to be denied
'
The panel's views on the
and separate panel reviews shall be held."159
desirability of a joint review under Rule 36 are irrelevant.
It is crucial to keep in mind that U.S. civil procedure has recently
begun evolving from this classical picture of the decisionmaker. Just as
most cases are decided at the pretrial level, where there is no all-important, rigid oral event, but rather a series of relatively informal hearings,
the U.S. legal system has witnessed the emergence of what Judith
Resnick terms "the managerial judge."
Many federal judges have departed from their earlier attitudes;
they have dropped the relatively disinterested pose to adopt a
more active, "managerial" stance. In growing numbers, judges
are not only adjudicating the merits of issues presented to them
by litigants, but also are meeting with parties in chambers to
encourage settlement of disputes and to supervise case preparation. Both before and after the trial, judges are playing a critical
role in shaping litigation and influencing results."w
The "managerial judge" described by Resnick departs radically from the
prototypically disengaged and dispassionate decisionmaker.
The movement toward the managerial judge, like that toward a flexible examination of the case, has been uneven. The extent to which this
trend has taken place, even within the U.S. federal system, varies from
one judicial chamber (and from one case) to the next. There has been,
further, a current flowing against the trend. Jurists have often criticized
the informal interaction in the courts as well as the expanded involvement
of the judiciary. It is fair to say that, at least in comparison to other systems, the United States legal system continues to be importantly influenced by a picture of procedure characterized by trial-like process and an
inactive decisionmaker, and insofar as it reproduces U.S. law, the panel
review procedure will similarly have to come to terms with this picture.
The panel review procedure also assimilates the common law prac-

158. Id. Rule 36(1).
159. Id. Rule 36(2).
160. Judith Resnick, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 376, 376-77 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
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tice of peremptory challenges in the selection of panel members. Each involved party has "the right to exercise four peremptory challenges, to be
exercised simultaneously and in confidence, disqualifying from appointment to the panel up to four candidates proposed by the other involved
Party."16' In U.S. civil cases, each party "is entitled to three peremptory
challenges" in the selection of a jury.'62 "The use of peremptory challenges is of ancient origin and is given to aid each party's interest in a
fair and impartial jury."' 63
In addition, the panel review procedure approaches attorney's fees in
a way that is generally consistent with the common law as it has developed in the United States. "In the United States," Merryman points out,
"if A sues someone, he usually must pay his own lawyer, whether he
wins or loses. ' ' "MSimilarly, Panel Rule 32 provides that "[e]ach participant shall bear the costs of, and those incidental to, its own participation
in a panel review."' 65 The panel review procedure thus adopts the socalled "American Rule" not just with respect to attorney's fees, but with
respect to all costs. In U.S. federal practice, costs other than attorney's
fees tend to be saddled on the losing party."
The panel procedure has been influenced by the U.S. common law
conception of not only the civil trial but also the civil appeal. In the United States, Merryman insists, the appeal "is thought of as primarily a
method of correcting mistakes of law made by the trial court."'6 7
Merryman contends that the presence of the jury has contributed decisively to the development of this conception of the civil appeal:
The use of a jury in civil actions at the common law obviously
forestalls review of the factual issues by an appellate court. The
jury does not make specific findings of fact; it may, and often
does, consider demeanor and other circumstantial factors; it need
not justify (i.e., explain) its verdict; and its proceedings are not
written. If the appellate court could independently decide factual
questions, the jury's role would, in effect, be nullified. As long
as there is some factual basis in the record to support the jury's

161. NAFrA, supra note 1, annex 1901.2, T 2.
162. 28 U.S.C § 1870 (1994).
163. CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2483
(1995).
164.

MERRYMAN, supra note 146, at 119.

165. 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 32.
166. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1).
167.

MERRYMAN, supra note 146, at 120.
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(or the trial judge's) verdict, the appellate court in a common
law jurisdiction will honor it.' 6
The 1904 panel review calls to mind this common law conception of
appellate review. It is, first of all, based on the record of the complaints
filed and procedural defenses thereto," and no provision is made for
consideration of any additional evidence. Second, the panel must either
"uphold a final determination, or remand it for action not inconsistent
with the panel's decision."' 70 The panel is, therefore, not viewed as
making an independent assessment of the case, but rather as passing on
the plausibility of the determination below. 7'
The manner in which the panel announces its decision at the end
also evokes the common law method. As discussed, the panel must issue
a written opinion supporting its reasoning and decision." Common law
systems notoriously are centered around the elaborate opinions of judges,
particularly at the appellate level. Those opinions are paramount sources
of law. They are the vehicles through which the common law emerges
and evolves. As such, the opinions of the judges must naturally be available in print, and in addition must lay out the reasoning of the judges so
that their content can be generalized and applied to other cases.
The broad impact of common law court decisions has contributed
significantly to the tendency of judges to concur or dissent in writing.
First, when more is at stake than the fate of the individuals before the
court, judges feel more inclined to distance themselves from opinions
with which they disagree. Second, the wider applicability of court decisions requires more explicit opinions, which in turn invites dissenting and
concurring opinions.
Common law judges do not merely issue decisions but also articulate
reasons. A concurring opinion makes sense only in situations where rea-

168. Id.
169. 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rules 7(a) & (b).
170. NAFrA, supra note 1,art. 1904, 18.
171. As discussed above, the panel is required to apply the standard of the court that would otherwise review the case. The panel may accordingly not be required explicitly to give any special deference to the findings of facts of the authority making the antidumping or countervailing duty determination. For instance, Article 28 of the Mexican Federal Tax Code simply establishes that the Federal
Tax Court must set aside the determination if it finds "incorrect or misunderstood facts." C6digo
Fiscal de laFederaci6n, art. 238 (Mex.) [hereinafter C.F.F.]. But not just any determination may be
overturned under these circumstances. It must be an "unfair determination." Id. So the Mexican Federal Tax Court must in fact defer to incorrect findings of fact of the investigating authority, unless the
determination is found to be unfair. Id.
172. 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 15, Rule 72.
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sons are attached to the decision. In addition, a dissenting opinion has
more of a point when contrasted with a majority opinion as opposed to a
decision that simply announces an outcome. In the former scenario, the
dissenter is elaborating her own reasons against those of the majority. In
the latter, the dissenter is merely registering the fact that she was outvoted.
In sum, the common law legal tradition, particularly as developed in
the United States, has thoroughly influenced Article 1904 panel review
process. The influence is evident not only in the details of this process
but also in the underlying conception of procedure. The process incorporates prototypical pictures of the trial and appellate proceedings-including a peculiar view of the pleading phase, of the role of the
decisionmaker, and of the distribution of attorney's fees-along with a
corresponding perception of the obligations of concurring and dissenting
judges.
Of course, there are counter-pictures at work in the U.S. common
law tradition as well, such as that of the informal and spread out pre-trial
proceedings and that of the managerial judge. It is possible that the Article 1904 panel review process, like civil procedure in the United States,
will occasionally develop toward the counter-pictures. Yet the main pictures will continue to play a key role--determining how legal actors think
of and structure procedure. The next section shows that the dominant conception of civil procedure in Mexican law is quite different.

VII. A DIFFERENT CONCEPTION OF PROCEDURE
A U.S. lawyer would feel right at home in any of these panel review
proceedings. To a Mexican jurist, however, the procedure would probably
seem foreign. In this sense, the Mexican jurist would probably react very
much like any other lawyer trained in the civil law tradition. This section
focuses on how the Mexican conception of procedure is, in many ways,
close to that of other civil law jurisdictions, such as Germany, and fundamentally at odds with the United States common law conception.
Civil procedure under Mexican law is not built around a single,
formal oral hearing. Authors James E. Herget and Jorge Camil explain
that the introduction of evidence "does not occur at one hearing at which
all parties and witnesses are present. There is no trial as such. Rather,
evidence is introduced at a series of hearings and is almost always reduced to writing by a secretary of the court."' Herget and Camil con-

173. JAMES. E.

HERGET & JORGE CAMIL, AN INTRODUCION TO THE MEXICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
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tend that spreading out the trial over a series of proceedings diminishes
the element of surprise: "If surprising testimony does turn up, the surprised party can always explore the new matter further or produce counter-testimony at the next hearing, since there is no significant limit on the
number of hearings or amount of evidence which either party can offer in
good faith."' 7 4 In a series of rather informal sessions, settlement is encouraged,'75 statements by the parties themselves are heard, 76 evidence is received,' and arguments of the lawyers are considered. 7
Civil procedure in Mexico is more episodic and less structured than in
common law jurisdictions such as the United States and Canada.
In the debate surrounding the North American Free Trade Agreement, this difference in the Mexican approach to civil procedure-as well
as other differences in Mexico's legal and economic institutions-was
perceived as a badge of backwardness, sometimes even by the Mexicans
themselves. The following comments on the NAFTA panel procedures by
Carlos Angulo Parra, a Mexican lawyer, appear to reflect this perception:
With respect to the procedure itself, I believe that an innovative
part of the procedure, at least for Mexico, would be the possibility of having one general hearing in the panel procedure. The
Mexican system of litigation generally requires a series of separate, written formal submissions to the court. The hearing, where
all of the issues of a matter are put into a single time frame and
all of the parties are put in a single room to address those issues, provides the panel with a concise and general presentation
of the facts and legal issues in the dispute so that a final resolution can be issued. This is an innovation from the Mexican point
of view. I believe that this is an opportunity for generating an
evolution within our system to improve Mexican procedures for
solving disputes. 79
Parra puts his finger on the key conceptual divergence between Mexican
and U.S. civil procedure. Mexican procedure, unlike U.S. procedure, does
74-75 (1978).
174. Id. at 75.
175. C6digo de Procedimientos Civiles para elDistrito Federal, art. 272A (Mex.) [hereinafter
C.P.C.D.F.].
176. Id. art. 389.
177. Id. arts. 390-92.
178. Id. art. 393.
179. Carlos A. Parra, Comments on the PotentialInfluence of NAFTA on Proceduresfor the Settlement of Disputes, 1 US-MEx. LJ. 29-30 (1993).
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not aim at formally concentrating all litigious activity into a single point
in space and time. However, the difference is not necessarily evidence of
underdevelopment in Mexico. It rather stems from Mexico's peculiar legal
background, as I will argue throughout this section. Improving Mexican
procedure perhaps should not be achieved by adopting U.S. norms but
rather by immanent development. In other words, Mexico should probably
seek to perfect its unconcentrated and flexible approach to procedure
instead of completely abandoning that approach in favor of the concentrated and formal system that prevails in the United States. In doing so,
Mexico would be well advised to turn to the experience of other civil law
jurisdictions, such as Germany.
In its gravitation toward dispersion and informality, Mexican procedure is solidly anchored in the civil law tradition. John Merryman writes
the following about that tradition:
There is no such thing as a trial in our sense; there is no single,
concentrated event. The typical civil proceeding in a civil law
country is actually a series of isolated meetings of and written
communications between counsel and the judge, in which evidence is introduced, testimony is given, procedural motions and
rulings are made, and so on. Matters of the sort that would
ordinarily be concentrated into a single event in a common law
jurisdiction will be spread over a large number of discrete appearances and written acts before the judge who is taking the
evidence."
Merryman's account of the civil law system echoes Herget and Camil's
description of Mexican civil procedure in pointing out the absence not
only of a trial as such, but also of an element of surprise. Merryman
states that "[t]he element of surprise is reduced to a minimum, since each
appearance is relatively brief and involves a fairly small part of the total
case. There will be plenty of time to prepare some sort of response before
the next appearance." '' The Mexican approach to civil procedure departs from that of the United States not because it is less developed, but
because it stems from a different legal tradition.
The German procedural system, which has been put forth as a model
for the U.S. system,'82 is also based on a multiplicity of informal hear-

180.

MERRYMAN, supra note 146, at 112.

181. Id. at 113.
182. "[B]y assigning judges rather than lawyers to investigate the facts, the Germans avoid the
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ings. In German civil procedure, "there is no distinction between pretrial
and trial, between discovering evidence and presenting it. Trial is not a
single continuous event. Rather, the court gathers and evaluates evidence
'
over a series of hearings, as many as the circumstances require."183
Thus, "the various oral hearings in the same case form a unity and constitute the basis of the judgment."' 84 Oral hearings do not have to follow a
particular sequence."s5 What happens from one hearing to the next, as
well as what happens within each of those hearings, need not follow an
ironclad pattern.
Merryman cautions, however, that "the trend in civil law jurisdictions has been toward greater concentration, with the rate of development
varying widely. ' Germany has certainly been at the forefront of this
movement. 8 ' As amended in 1976, the German Code of Civil Procedure reads: "As a rule, the ' 8case
should be resolved in a single hearing,
8
comprehensively prepared.'
The simplification amendment of 1976 imposed on the courts
more emphatically the duty finally to dispose of the legal dispute through a comprehensively prepared oral hearing, i.e., the
main hearing .... The experience with the new law up to now
has been that courts actually take advantage of the opportunity
to speed up the procedure.8 9
This increase in procedural concentration has been accompanied, in Germany and other civil law jurisdictions, by an evolution toward orality and
immediacy." 9 These jurisdictions, in other words, have been relying inmost troublesome aspects of our practice." Langbein, supra note 146, at 824 (footnote omitted).
183. Id. at 826 (footnote omitted).
184. ROSENBERG Er AL., ZIVILPROZESSRECHT § 81, at 447 (1993).
185. Id.
186. MERRYMAN, supra note 146, at 112.
187. "Austria and Germany seem to be moving most rapidly in this direction." Id.
188. Zivilprozefrrdnung [Code of Civil Procedure] § 272 I [hereinafter ZPO].
189. ROSENBERG Er AL., supra note 184, § 84, at 452.
190. CARLOS ARELLANO GARdA, TEORiA GENERAL DEL PROCESO 39 (1992) (citing RAFAEL DE
PINA, DICCIONARIO DEL DERECHO 68 (1965)). Carlos Arellano Garcia connects the principles of concentration, orality, and immediacy. Id. at xx. Merryman, in turn, speaks of "the interrelated criteria of
concentration, immediacy, and orality." MERRYMAN, supra note 146, at 116. He expounds the point
thus:
A trend toward immediacy in civil proceedings carries with it a trend toward orality, and
orality is promoted also by the trend toward concentration. Civil law proceduralists think of
the three matters as related to one another, and one frequently encounters discussion in
which concentration, immediacy, and orality are advances as interrelated components of
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creasingly on oral as opposed to written procedural interaction, and on
direct contact with the deciding judge throughout the whole case. 91 Civillaw courts tend more and more to listen to the parties in open proceedings and less and less to require the parties to deal with the judges' deputies or secretaries, particularly during the examination of the evidence.
Mexico has also experienced this general development. There has
been an attempt to concentrate civil proceedings in Mexico, though certainly not to the extent that Germany has. Mexican legal scholar Rafael
de Pina has argued "that there should be the least number possible of
hearings because the more proximate the procedural activities are to the
decision, the lesser the danger that the impression received by the decision maker will be erased and that his memory will deceive him."'"
This shift toward orality is well under way in the Mexican legal system.
"This procedural regulation of the oral reception and consideration of the
evidence is one of the undeniable achievements of the Code of Civil
Procedures for the Federal District."'93 "The oral procedure makes possible an ideal personal and direct communication between the judge, on
the one hand, and the parties, witnesses, and experts, on the other hand.
This ideal communication is one of the consequential principles of
orality."'94 Proponents of these ideas would undoubtedly endorse the
following dictum from a German textbook on civil procedure: "Orality is
to be held on to under all circumstances. In public administration and in
private economic life, difficult negotiations are carried out successfully
only in oral discussion. ' '195
Finally, immediacy has become one of the central aspirations of
Mexican civil procedure. Mexican proceduralist Eduardo Pallares underscores that the principle of immediacy "essentially requires that the judge
be in personal contact with the parties in order to receive their evidence,
listen to their arguments, interrogate them, etc."'" Though the practice

proposals for reform in the law of civil procedure.
Id. at 114.
191. MERRYMAN, supra note 146, at 114. Merryman calls attention to the fact that "there is a
steady evolution in civil law jurisdictions toward greater immediacy." Id.
192. ARELLANO GARCiA, supra note 190, at 39 (1992) (citing RAFAEL DE PINA, DICCIONARIO
DEL DERECHO 68 (1965)).
193. RAFAEL DE PINA & JOSE CASTILLO LARRAfqAGA, DERECHO PROCESAL CIVIL 390 (1990).

194. Id.
195. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 184, § 80, at 441.
196. ARELLANO GARCiA, supra note 190, at 37 (quoting EDUARDO PALLARES, DICCIONARIO DEL
DERECHO PROCESAL CIVIL 595 (1966)).
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of having the court's secretary receive the evidence persists to some extent, 197 it runs counter to the provisions of the Federal District's Code of
Civil Procedures'98 and has been vehemently rejected by legal schol99
ars. 1
The civil law tradition's gravitation toward the principles of concentration, orality, and immediacy has brought that tradition, in a sense,
closer to the common law world. This approximation, however, is somewhat superficial. Civil law proceedings have preserved a distinct flavor.
What goes on during these proceedings sets them apart from the realm of
the common law; they are less formal, more open-ended. This distinctiveness is no doubt related to a history in which a dispersed, mediated, and
written procedure prevailed. That history gave rise to a particular approach to procedure which has survived to this day. But the persistence of
that approach is due to the fact not only that old habits die slowly, but
also that the drift toward concentration, immediacy, and orality has not
been unequivocal.
In Germany, the call for concentration in the Code of Civil Procedure has certainly not eliminated the differences between German procedure and that of common law systems. Many cases, due to their complexity, cannot be completely resolved during the main hearing. "For
cases that do not lend themselves to one-hearing resolution," John
Langbein explains, "the 1977 amendments [enacted in 1976] have not
2
altered the episodic character of the procedure. '""
Langbein insists that even in simpler cases, which are decided in the
main hearing, significant procedural differences between the German and

197. "In the busier courts," Herget and Camil report, "sometimes the judge is not present at [the
evidentiary] hearings and the court secretary asks the questions as well as types the answers."
HERGET & CAMIL, supra note 173, at 75; see also ARELLANO GARCiA, supra note 190, at 103.
198. "The hearing must be presided by the judge, as established by Article 58 of the Code of
Civil Procedures." ARELLANO GARCiA, supra note 190, at 103; see C.P.C.D.F. art. 58.

199. "In this manner," Carlos Arellano Garcia protests, "the basic goal of orality, which should
prevail at the hearing and which aims at the immediacy between the parties and the judge so that the
formal truth does not fully cover up the real truth, is lost." ARELLANO GARCIA, supra note 190, at
103. Rafael de Pina and Jos6 Castillo Larrafiaga, for their part, declare:
The reception and consideration of the evidence in a public hearing requires the inexcusable
presence of the judge. This-along with the judge's power to question directly the parties,
witnesses, and experts-guarantees that in the course of this whole operation there will be
no interferences that might corrupt the role corresponding to the head of the jurisdictional
organ on this matter, which constitutes the heart of civil procedure.
DE PINA & CAsTILo LARRAN4AGA, supra note 193, at 390.

200. Langbein, supra note 146, at 827 n.9.
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U.S. common law systems persist. "[E]ven in such cases, because the
court has the option to schedule further hearings if developments at the
initial hearing seem to warrant further proofs or submissions, German
procedure is devoid of the opportunities for surprise and tactical advantage that inhere in the Anglo-American concentrated trial."2"1 German
procedural law cultivates the difference of its civil proceedings in ways
other than by allowing the possibility of further hearings. Regarding the
oral hearing, the German Code of Civil Procedure states that "[tihe parties
shall make their submissions in an open discussion." '2"2 The format of
the hearing is kept deliberately loose. As discussed below, judges are
given substantial freedom to structure and run the oral hearing as they see
fit.
Benjamin Kaplan refers to the distinct character of German civil
procedure as the "conference method" of adjudication.2 3 John Langbein,
accordingly, underscores the "business-like" character of German civil
procedure: "German civil proceedings have the tone not of the theater, but
of a routine business meeting-serious rather than tense.""
Mexican civil procedure has also kept its distance vis-a-vis the realm
of common law. First, there has been even less of a shift toward concentration in Mexico than in Germany. Second, instead of completely abandoning the written system in favor of the oral system, Mexico (like Germany)2 "5 has opted for a hybrid regime:
Our ordinary procedure is hybrid. Despite the theoretical benefits attributed to the exclusively oral procedure and the deficiencies underscored with respect to the written procedure, in 1931
the legislature, well aware of the Mexican reality, sought a middle ground and created a hybrid procedure. It required the judge
to be in direct contact with the parties and with third parties
during the hearing of the evidence. Yet, it adopted the written
form for requests and petitions directed at the judge, so that
these would be preserved and thus available for later inspection.2'

201. Id. at 826-27 n.9; see ZPO § 136 III.
202. ZPO § 137 II.
203. Benjamin Kaplan, Civil Procedure: Reflections on the Comparisons of Systems, 9 BUFF. L.
REv. 409, 410 (1960).

204. Langbein, supra note 146, at 831.
205. See generally ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 184, § 80, at 441 ("The procedure in our Code
of Civil Procedure is oral although the hearing is prepared through written pleadings.").
206. Jost BECERRA BAUTISTA, EL PROCESO CIVIL EN Mtmco 53 (1986).
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The defects of the Mexican written procedure "are defects inherent in the
personnel of the courts rather than of the procedure itself."2" Moving
toward an exclusively oral procedure in imitation of the U.S. system,
scholars argue, may be a mistake:
[W]e do not believe that the human vices of those who do not
comply with the dispositions in force should lead, in a purely
mimetic spirit, to the overthrow a procedural system established
on the basis of centuries of experience and to the substitution of
that system by another one. The latter may be wonderful for the
Saxon race but is unadaptable to our medium." 8
This vibrant rhetoric drives home the simple fact that Mexico has held on
to its civil law conception of procedure, despite the trend toward orality.
Finally, even though the law and legal scholars have wholeheartedly
embraced the principle of immediacy, that principle has not been fully
implemented in practice. This fact tends to reinforce Mexico's place within the civil law tradition.
In sum, civil proceedings in the civil law tradition are evolving toward more concentration and orality (though less than in the common law
tradition) on the one hand, and toward complete immediacy on the other.
This turn of events may be seen in Mexico as well as in Germany. The
civil law procedural system continues to demarcate itself from the common law system because it aspires to less concentration and orality and
because in countries such as Mexico its aspiration to full immediacy is
often not fulfilled. The inner dynamics of civil procedure in the civil law
tradition have, in fact, remained fundamentally distinct. Civil proceedings
in civil law countries, particularly in Mexico and Germany, are generally
more flexible, informal, and business-like. Civil law systems have stayed
relatively close (despite their evolution) in their conception of the civil
proceeding. This is so, not only because they have common origins and
face similar challenges, but also because there is a significant degree of
cross-fertilization in the debate on civil procedure. Individuals who ponder and discuss civil procedure in civil law countries tend to be aware of
each other's efforts.'
The different kind of civil proceeding in the civil law tradition is

207. Id. at 170.
208. Id.
209. Of course, the European standpoint usually dominates this debate. European commentators
are more widely read than their non-European counterparts.
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bound up with a different understanding of pleading and discovery. In the
common law tradition, "pleading is very general, and the issues are defined as the proceeding goes on."2 ' This description of the pleading
phase applies to Mexican as well as German civil procedure. " ' Discovery plays a less prominent role in the civil law than in the common law
tradition. Merryman elucidates this point: "The lack of concentration...
explains the lesser importance of discovery (advance information about
the opponent's witnesses and evidence) .... Discovery is less necessary
because there is little, if any, tactical or strategic advantage to be gained
from the element of surprise." ' Herget and Camil, similarly, connect
the insignificance of discovery in Mexico to the lack of concentration and
of the element of surprise:
Since there is no trial in Mexico, there is no need for discovery
as such. It is of course possible to obtain an order from the
court directed to one of the parties or a third party to produce
certain evidence or to testify about something. However, when
this is done the evidence so produced simply becomes part of
the expediente. If surprising testimony does turn up, the surprised party can always explore the new matter further or produce counter-testimony at the next hearing, since there is no
significant limit on the number of hearings or amount of evidence which either party can offer in good faith.2"3
In Mexico, like Germany, discovery not only plays a minimal role but
also is mostly conducted by the judge." 4
Though the extent of their involvement in civil procedure has been
exaggerated,"' civil law judges appear to be more engaged than their
counterparts in the common law tradition. This is certainly the case in
Mexico as well as in Germany. 6 Mexican civil judges are very active

210. MERRYMAN, supra note 146, at 113. Merryman links this approach to pleading with the lack
of concentration in the civil law tradition. Id.
211. HERGET & CAMIL, supra note 173, at 74.
212. MERRYMAN, supra note 146, at 113.
213. HERGET & CAMiL, supra note 173, at 75.

214. See Gary Taylor, The Mexican Way of Litigation, NAT'L L.J.,
June 27, 1994, at A24 ("Aggressive U.S. trial lawyers will be frustrated to learn that Mexican judges conduct pretrial discovery.").
215. MERRYMAN, supra note 146, at 114-15.
216. Merryman concedes that "in Germany the law and the judicial tradition encourage the judge
to play an active role in the proceedings." Id. at 115. The same could be said about the Mexican
system.
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throughout the judicial proceeding. They are required to encourage settlement. The Federal District's Code of Civil Procedures provides: "Once
the complaint and the plea in reconvention (if any) have been answered,
the judge shall immediately set a date and a time for a preliminary and
conciliation hearing."2 7 During that hearing, upon considering procedural issues, the judge asks the conciliator assigned to the court to seek a
conciliation of the parties. "If the parties arrive at an agreement, the judge
shall approve it right away, if legal."2 ' "If the parties fail to reach an
agreement, the hearing shall continue. ' The
code grants the judge
220
"broad powers in conducting the proceeding."
Judges carry their "broad powers" into the evidentiary phase of procedure. They take a leading role, for instance, in the examination of the
witnesses. 221 "The judge may, in virtue of his office, broadly interrogate
the witnesses with respect to the facts at issue in the evidentiary hearing
in order better to ascertain the truth. 222 Only after making this statement does the Code establish that "the parties may also interrogate the
witness. ' '2' The Code cautions that the parties "must limit themselves to
the disputed facts or issues" and adds: "The judge must strictly exclude
pointless or irrelevant questions. 224
In Mexican procedure, the parties themselves are required personally
to make statements, i.e., to provide "confessional evidence. ' '2' The Federal District's Code of Civil Procedures allows the parties to pose questions to each other during this stage. 2' Not surprisingly, the Code also
states that "[t]he court may freely interrogate the parties with respect to
the facts and circumstances relevant to finding out the truth. '227 Generally, regarding the interrogation of the parties as well as of the witnesses,
the Code declares: "The court shall have the broadest powers to ask witnesses and parties those questions deemed relevant to establishing the

217. C.P.C.D.F. art. 272A; see BECERRA BAUTISTA, supra note 206, at 56-57, 172-73.
218. C.P.C.D.F. art. 272A. "The agreement shall have the effect of res judicata." Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. "When a witness testifies, the judge asks the questions, although lawyers for either side can
request the judge to ask certain questions or to explore a certain subject in his interrogation. There is
no cross examination." HERGET & CAstL, supra note 173, at 75.
222. C.P.C.D.F. art. 392.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. art. 317.
226. Id. arts. 317, 389.
227. Id. art. 318.
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22
truth with respect to the disputed issues.""
The Code bestows upon judges broad powers in the consideration of
all, not just testimonial, evidence. The parties, to be sure, offer the evidence. Yet the judges, in addition to deciding whether the evidence is
admissible,2 29 must "receive and examine it. ' Judges have substantial latitude in terms of the kind of evidence they rely on. "In order to
find out the truth about the disputed issues, the judge may rely on any
person (parties as well as others), object or document (belonging to the
parties or others). The only limitation is that the evidence may not be
prohibited by law or be morally objectionable." 23'
Judges also have great discretion in deciding how the evidence will
be examined. The judges' broad authority to examine evidence includes
the right "personally [to] inspect items of physical evidence including
premises. 232

The courts may, at any time and in any kind of case, order the
execution and extension of any kind of evidentiary hearing, if
conducive to the ascertainment of the truth with respect to the
contested issues. In conducting these hearings, the judge shall
proceed as he sees fit in order to obtain the best result, without
violating the rights of the parties. He must listen to the parties
and treat them equally.233
"Articles 278 and 279 give the judge very broad powers with respect to
the timing of the production of evidence, the manner in which the production of evidence is carried out, and the kind of evidentiary means to
be utilized." 34
At the end of the reception of the evidence the court shall order the
parties to make oral arguments-personally or through their attorneys:
first the plaintiff and then the defendant. 2 35 This phase sounds quite
similar to the closing arguments in common law trials. Again, the judge is
more involved: "The courts shall direct the debate, admonishing the par-

Id. art. 366; see BECERRA BAUTISTA, supra note 206, at 125.
C.P.C.D.F. art. 298; see BEcERRA BAUTISTA, supra note 206, at 104.
See BECERRA BAUTISTA, supra note 206, at 106.
C.P.C.D.F. art. 278; see EDUARDO PALLARES, DERECHO PROCESAL CIVIL 357 (1978);
BECERRA BAUTISTA, supra note 206, at 100.
232. HERGET & CAMIL, supra note 173, at 75.
233. C.P.C.D.F. art. 279; see PALLARES, supra note 231, at 357; BECERRA BAUTISTA, supra note
206, at 98.
234. PALLARES, supra note 231, at 357.
235. C.P.C.D.F. art. 393.
228.
229.
230.
231.
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ties to concentrate themselves on the disputed issues and to avoid digressions. The courts may interrupt the parties to request explanations and
they may interrogate the parties with respect to those issues they deem
relevant. '' 1 6 Unlike their counterparts in the common law, Mexican
judges must, in essence, argue along with the attorneys for the parties.
In its assignment of an active role to the judge, the Mexican regime
of civil procedure resembles German procedure. In Germany, the trial
court also has broad control over the proceedings:
The direction of the proceedings is the responsibility of the
court in virtue of its office and does not require a motion or a
suggestion by the parties. Nor can the parties relieve the court of
its duties. The court must dutifully deliberate on those decisions
placed within its discretion."
German, like Mexican, judges are required to seek a settlement. In fact,
German judges have a continual obligation to promote conciliation
throughout the whole proceeding. Section 279 of the Code of Civil Procedure, under the heading "Amicable resolution/Attempt at conciliation,"
provides:
I. The court shall in every procedural situation look to an amicable resolution of the legal dispute or of specific issues in dispute. It may refer the parties to a commissioned or requested
judge in order to attempt to reach an amicable settlement.
II. The personal appearance of the parties may be ordered in
order to attempt to reach an amicable settlement. 8
Because German judges are closely in touch with the disputed issues
well as with the parties, they are "strongly positioned to encourage
litigant to abandon a case that is turning out to be weak or hopeless, or
239
'
recommend settlement.
In addition to pushing for settlement, German judges have a duty
clarify:
The chairperson must bring about that the parties manifest themselves completely with respect to all the relevant facts and that
they make the pertinent motions; particularly that they supple-

236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. art. 395.
ROSENBERG Er AL., supra note 184, § 79, at 435.
ZPO § 279; see ROSENBERG E- AL., supra note 184, § 79, at 440.
Langbein, supra note 146, at 832.

as
a
to
to
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ment insufficient declarations on the asserted facts and describe
the evidence. To this end, he shall discuss with the parties, in so
far as he is so required, the facts of the case and the issues in
the factual and legal perspective as well as ask
dispute from
questions." 4
In performing this duty, judges must do more than alert the parties that
they are proceeding incorrectly. Judges must also make specific suggestions on how to remedy the defects that have been pointed out.24'
Judges also have extensive obligations with respect to the preparation
of the hearings.242 When the parties are not represented, judges usually
schedule a preliminary hearing to lay the groundwork for future hearings. 43 If there is counsel, the planning for the hearing is normally carried out through pleadings." The Code of Civil Procedure further empowers judges, in preparing each hearing, to:
1. [C]all on the parties to supplement or elucidate their preparatory pleadings as well as to present documents or objects suitable to be brought before the court and set a deadline for the
explanation of specific issues in need of clarification;
2. [R]equest public officials or holders of public office to transmit documents or to furnish official information;
3. [O]rder the personal appearance of the parties; [and]
4. [S]ummon witnesses, to which the parties have alluded, or
experts to the oral hearing as well as enter an order pursuant to
§ 378 [i.e., to compel a witness to bring records and documents
relevant to his or her testimony].245
It is, in fact, through these measures that judges are expected to dispose
of many cases in one main hearing. 4 6

240. ZPO § 139 I.
241. See ROSENBERG Er AL., supra note 184, § 79, at 439.
242. ZPO § 273.
243. See ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 184, § 106, at 601.
244. ZPO § 129 I.
245. Id. § 273 II.
246. Rosenberg, Schwab, and Gottwald note:
German judges hold the main hearing only after this ample preparation. Thus, the legal
dispute is usually resolved during this hearing, at which the evidence is introduced and the
judgment is announced (§ 272 I). This goal can be achieved only if the court amply prepares
the proceeding and also gets involved thoroughly in the case.
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German judges also completely dominate the hearings themselves.
The oral hearing starts with a waivable introduction to the case and the
disputed issues. 7
Since the main hearing is preceded by a preparatory written or
oral procedure, in this introduction the court lays out the disputed matters, which from the court's point of view will be relevant
to the decision, and identifies, as far as possible, the point of
contention, which will be essential for the upcoming hearing.
ing 248
The Code alludes to the next stage of the main hearing as follows: "The
parties present should thus be personally heard. ' 249 This, of course, calls
to mind Mexican civil procedure. German judges, like their Mexican
counterparts, may thoroughly interrogate the parties in order to get to the
truth of the matter.
The German Code of Civil Procedure requires that the evidence be
considered during the main hearing: "The introduction of the evidence
should immediately follow the adversarial hearing. '"" Like in Mexico,
the court is very involved. The interrogation of the witnesses (including
expert witnesses) is "a primary task of the court."'" "The judge," in the
words of John Langbein, "serves as the examiner-in-chief. ' ' 1 2 Langbein
adds: "At the conclusion of his interrogation of each witness, counsel for
either party may pose additional questions, but counsel are not prominent
as examiners.""
German judges, therefore, have considerable power and flexibility
when it comes to structuring and running the hearing. They do not have
to follow a pre-ordained script, and are urged to proceed as circumstances
require. Moreover, there is no specific formula that tells judges when they
must bring the proceeding to an end. Instead, they have the authority to

ROSENBERG Er AL., supra note 184, § 106, at 602; see also Langbein, supra note 146, at 826.
247. ZPO § 278 I ("In the main hearing, the court introduces the state of affairs and the state of
the dispute."). Rosenberg, Schwab, and Gottwald point out that the parties may (and often do) waive
this introduction. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 184, § 106, at 602.

248. ROSENBERG Er AL., supra note 184, § 106, at 602.
249. ZPO § 278 I. Cf.id. § 137 IV ("In a suit by counsel, the parties themselves, not just their
attorneys, are to be permitted to speak if they so move."); see also ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note
184, § 106, at 602.
250. ZPO § 278 11.
251. ROSENBERG Er AL., supra note 184, § 79, at 439.
252. Langbein, supra note 146, at 828.

253. Id.
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close to hearing when, in their view, "the issues have been fully discussed." 4
The distinct understanding of the function of the judge in the civil
law tradition hangs together with a particular image of the role of the
parties. The parties do not run the show; they are less independent than in
common law systems. They, as well as their attorneys, play a crucial (and
even adversarial) part, but they confront each other less directly. The
court is not supposed to be merely an arena in which they may carry out
their battle; it is instead an institution which processes their dispute.
Because the common law regards the parties as independent wills
battling to have their way, it makes sense to require each party to pay her
own attorney's fees. Each contestant, it could be said, chooses (and pays
for) her weapon. In the United States the general rule is that each party
bears her own attorney's fees. 5
"In civil law countries, as in England, the loser usually pays the
winner's counsel fees." 6 The civil law tradition does not distinguish
between attorney's fees and court costs. It shifts attorneys' fees to the
losing party, as part of the costs. Apparently, counsel is seen less as an
extension of the parties and more as part of the process. There is a different image of the attorneys as well as of the parties.
In the German legal system, the losing party normally must pay the
prevailing party's litigation costs, including attorney's fees: "The losing
party must bear the costs of the legal dispute.... The legally allowed expenses of the attorney for the prevailing party are to be reimbursed in all
cases." 7 The practice in the federal courts in Mexico is similar. "The
Federal Code of Civil Procedures follows the criterion of those regimes
''28
that impose the payment of costs as a consequence of defeat (Art. 7).
The Federal District's Code of Civil Procedure, however, takes a less
clear-cut approach. It generally imposes costs when required by law and
when the losing party has proceeded with temerity. 9 It also shifts costs
in certain specific circumstances, including cases in which the losing
party offers no evidence or false evidence on behalf of his claim, raises a

254. ZPO § 136.
255. See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1960, 1965 (1994) ("[A]ttomey's fees
generally are not a recoverable cost of litigation 'absent explicit congressional authorization."') (citation omitted).
256. MERRYMAN, supra note 146, at 119.
257. ZPO § 91 1,H.
258. DE PINA & CASTILLO LARRA5 AGA, supra note 193, at 342.
259. C.P.C.D.F. art. 140.
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claim clearly without merit, or delays the proceedings unnecessarily.'
At any1 rate, it is understood in Mexico that the costs include attorney's
fees.

26

The civil law tradition diverges from the common law tradition in
the conception of the appeal as well as in that of the trial.
In the civil law tradition, the right of appeal includes the right to
reconsideration of factual, as well as legal issues. Although the
tendency commonly is to rely on the record prepared below as
the factual basis for reconsideration of the case, in many jurisdictions the parties have the right to introduce new evidence at
the appellate level. The appellate bench is expected to consider
all of the evidence itself and to arrive at an independent determination of what the facts are and what their significance is. It is
also required to prepare its own fully reasoned opinion, in which
it discusses both factual and legal issues. 62
This account certainly does justice to German civil procedure. "The legal
dispute shall be heard all over again by the court of appeals within the
limits set by the motions." 3 As John Langbein points out, "No presumption of correctness attaches to the initial judgment."'
The treatise by Rosenberg, Schwab, and Gottwald elucidates the
nature of the appeal:
The appeal takes place against the judgments of the trial court
(magistrate or district court). The goal is not just the correction
of factual and legal mistakes of the lower court. The appeal is
also aimed at a completely new decision in the legal dispute

260. Id.
261. See DE PINA & CASTILLO LARRANAGA, supra note 193, at 342 ("The concept of costs comprises... attorney's fees."); BECERRA BAuriSTA, supra note 206, at 204 (The award of costs "covers ... the fees of the attorney representing the opposing party."); PALLAREs, supra note 231, at 180
(The costs "encompass the fees of the attorneys representing the parties.").
262. MERRYMAN, supra note 146, at 120.
263. ZPO § 525. The code elsewhere provides:
The object of the hearing and decision by the court of appeal consists in all the disputed
issues that relate to an upheld or a dismissed claim and that (according to the motions) require a hearing or a decision. This is so even if there was no hearing or decision in the first
legal round with respect to those disputed issues.

Id. § 537.
264. Langbein, supra note 146, at 856.
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through a continuation and a renewal of the hearing and with ius
novorum-i.e., the general admissibility of new claims and defenses (§§ 527ff., § 523 with § 282). This, to be sure, has been
limited since the amendment of February 13, 1924 and October
27, 1933, as well as the simplification amendment of
1976 ...265
The amendments alluded to reduced the appellate court's liberty to consider new evidence and issues. "The main task in review de novo," John
Langbein explains, "is not... gathering new evidence, but considering
afresh the record and the judgment from below."": Langbein makes it
clear, however, that "the appellate court can form its own view of the
facts, both from the record
and, if appropriate, by recalling witnesses or
''2 7
summoning new ones. 1
In Mexico, even though the concept of the civil appeal does not
appear to involve a review de novo of the case,26 there is no presumption of correctness attached to that judgment. According to Rafael de Pina
and Jos6 Castillo Larrafiaga:
The activity of the appellate judge falls upon the matter which
was the object of the process, not exclusively upon the sentence
of the trial court. This activity nonetheless has the limitation
imposed by the appellant's claim. The tribunal is not permitted
to add grievances that have not been formulated at all nor to
supplement those that have been formulated deficiently. 69
Herget and Camil similarly maintain that the court of appeals "makes its
own decision on both factual and legal issues. 2 71 Jos6 Becerra Bautista

265.

ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 184, § 134, at 802.

266. Langbein, supra note 146, at 857.
267. Id. at 828.
268. Jos6 Becerra Bautista contends that the Mexican appellate system, which is derived from the
Spanish, consists in revisio prioris instantiae, as opposed to a novum judicium. BECERRA BAUTISTA,
supra note 206, at 590. The appellate suit, he insists,
is not one in which the same problems considered by the trial court are brought up again
with the full knowledge of the court of appeals. It is, instead, a review of the resolution
dictated by the trial court so as to correct the errors in judicando or in procedando, alleged
by the petitioning party in the statement of grievances.
Id. at 591.
269.
270.

DE PINA & CASTILLO LARRAf4AGA, supra note 193, at 358.
HERGET & CAmiL, supra note 173, at 76.
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notes that in exceptional cases, evidence not considered by the trial court
may be admitted on appeal."' Also in contrast to the common law, the
Federal District's Code of Civil Procedures allows the court to 272
affirm,
reverse, or modify the judgment from below, but not to remand it.
In the civil law tradition, judges rarely write concurring or dissenting
opinions.
In general, there are no separate concurring or dissenting opinions, even at the appellate level, in civil law jurisdictions. Although exceptions do exist, the general rule is one of unanimity
and anonymity. Even dissenting votes are not noted, and it is
considered unethical for a judge to indicate that he has taken a
position
at variance with that announced in the decision of the
2 73
court.

This general statement could be applied to the Mexican as well as to the
German legal system. Of course, as Merryman acknowledges, there is a
trend in the civil law tradition toward writing dissents and concurrences
in constitutional cases.274
VIH. CONCLUSION
It would be incorrect, as well as pointless, to assert categorically that
the Mexican civil law approach to procedure is superior to the United
States common law approach. Any such assertion would add tribalism
instead of insight to the debate. The main aim of this article has been to
show that Mexico has a distinct civil procedure, partly because of its civil
law heritage. In addition to having a different genealogy and history, that
procedure reflects different presuppositions and a different structure.
It is unfortunate that the debate on dispute resolution in the North
American Free Trade Agreement, particularly in the area of antidumping
and countervailing duties, did not appreciate Mexico's different procedural perspective. It would have been illuminating to attempt to imagine an
international procedural structure that drew on different viewpoints. In
such a process of imagination, the challenge would have been to stay
within the bounds of coherence. There would have been a constant danger
of ending up with a tossed salad of discrete procedural mechanisms that

271.

BECERRA BAUTISTA, supra note 206, at 591.

272. C.P.C.D.F. art. 688.
273. MERRYMAN, supra note 146, at 121.
274. Id.
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did not mesh smoothly or function properly.
It might thus have been possible to come up with an eclectic but
reasonable procedure. The procedure could have sought to draw coherently upon the approaches not only of the countries involved, but also of
other countries and institutions. Consider the following procedural picture:
various flexible and business-like hearings; the dispute regarded not as
one between two adversaries but as one between different images of
regional integration and interregional justice; and the panel members
thoroughly engaged, but required to justify their conclusions, including
their concurring and dissenting positions. In this hypothetical scenario, the
panelists would be allowed, like in the procedure under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,275 to take into account the special situation of Mexico as a developing country. Any person or group with a
legitimate interest would have the right to become a party and would not
be penalized, but rather encouraged, when they brought reasonable claims.
Therefore, the costs, including attorneys' fees, would be paid by the three
NAFTA parties according to their level of wealth.
It would have been enlightening to have a robust dialogue to imagine
a new procedure along these lines. Yet any such discussion was out of the
question at the formative stages. The negotiations on the Agreement were
more about coercion than about conversation. Mexico had to accept the
ways of the North-not just on procedural issues, but on other questions
of law as well as on questions of economics-in order to become a member.
Now, a few general comments on the expansion of NAFTA. A fate
similar to that of Mexico probably awaits other Latin American countries
interested in joining the Agreement individually. They too would have to
sacrifice their legal and economic identity. Their best strategy is perhaps
to develop and strengthen their own free trade agreements. Further down
the road, they may want to give some thought to joining the North American trading block. But they should not do so as individual countries.
Instead, they should, as members of Mercosur, Caricom, Mercado Comiin
Centroamericano, Grupo de los Tres, and Grupo Andino, join the North
American countries in an attempt multilaterally to develop a new conception of hemispheric integration.
Chile does not yet belong to any of these free trade groups and has
already set the process in motion to join the North American trading

275. 1994 Uruguay Round Understanding on Dispute Settlement, art. 12, § 11 (the panel must
take into account the differential and more favorable treatment for developing country Members).
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block. If successful (which is far from certain), Chile could then try to
form an alliance with Mexico in order to build a counterweight to Canada
and the United States. Chile and Mexico could strive for the "Latin
Americanization" of the Agreement, thus paving the way for a pluralistic
hemispheric integration. The prospects of such a strategy, of course, are
not particularly bright. The negotiating position of the United States,
where the number and power of the NAFrA-skeptics has grown, would
in all likelihood be even stronger against a Chile-Mexico alliance than it
was against Mexico. As a member of the Agreement, Chile's only option
would be to attempt, like Mexico has, to foster its economic relations to
other Latin American countries, and to enter bilateral free trade agreements with them. Mexico and Chile would thus have a better chance of
resisting complete economic and legal assimilation.
Sidney Weintraub has argued that even from the North American
perspective, it makes economic sense to aim at a deliberate and multilateral integration of the western hemisphere. 76 He points out that a
quick and bilateral incorporation of other Latin American countries would
lead to superficial integration only.2" He recommends a deepening of
the existing Agreement and of the relations between the current members
before an expansion is even considered.27 From the legal point of view,
this makes sense; however, an enhancement of the regional free trade
pacts between Latin American countries is also essential, both economically and legally. Only thus will they be in a position to protect their
legal as well as economic identities.

276. See SIDNEY WEINTRAUB, NAFTA: WHAT COMES NEXT? xxi (1994).
277. Id. at 82.
278. Id.

